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PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE-1954 TENNESSEE SURVEY
EDMUND M. MORGAN*
PLEADING
Generally: The strict rules of pleading are not applicable in a will
contest,' which is a proceeding sui generis and regulated by statute.
Demurrer. A demurrer to a cross-bill in chancery on the ground
that it "states no cause of action upon which relief can be granted" is
a nullity, and should be stricken on motion. It is also subject to a mo-
tion to have it state the grounds more specifically. 2 For the purpose of
determining the sufficiency of a pleading attacked by demurrer, al-
legations of well pleaded facts are taken as true, but this does not
apply to conclusions of the pleader, and particularly to conclusions of
law. Thus an allegation of facts as to the use and age of a gas heater
is conceded to be true but not an allegation that the heater was in-
herently dangerous.3 And in an action to recover on a sick and acci-
dent policy, notwithstanding a release given by plaintiff in exchange
for a specified sum of money, his allegation that defendant owed him
in unpaid benefits on the policy more than the specified sum was a
mere conclusion which assumed the policy still in force and was not
the equivalent of an allegation of payment or tender of the amount
received.4 A fortiori an allegation that a city ordinance is unconstitu-
tional, a bare conclusion of law, is totally ineffective against a de-
murrer.5 Likewise where specific facts pleaded show no joint liability
of plaintiff and defendant, the pleader's conclusion therefrom that
they became jointly liable and that plaintiff has a right to contribution
from defendant is worthless. 6
Plea in Abatement: Where the chancellor upon hearing a plea in
abatement of another action pending for the same cause, found that
the cause was substantially the same, and granted plaintiff permission
to file the bill in the later suit as an amended or supplemental com-
plaint, plaintiff had no ground for reversal because he had been given
*Frank C. Rand Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; Royall Professor
of Law Emeritus and former Acting Dean, Harvard Law School; Reporter,
A. L. I. Model Code of Evidence; member, Supreme Court's Advisory Com-
mittee on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; co-editor, Morgan and Maguire,-
Cases and Materials on Evidence (3d. ed. 1951); author, Basic Problems of
Evidence (1954).
1. Wrinkle v. Williams, 260 S.W.2d 304 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1953).
2. Greenville Cabinet Co. v. Hauff, 263 S.W.2d 526 (Tenn. 1953).
3. Evens v. Young, 264 S.W.2d 577 (Tenn. 1954).
4. Gibbons v. Mutual Ben. Health & Accident Ass'n, 195 Tenn. 339, 259
S.W.2d 563 (1953).
5. Bricker v. Sims, 195 Tenn. 361, 259 S.W.2d 661 (1953).
6. Vaughn v. Gill, 264 S.W.2d 805 (Tenn. 1954).
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full opportunity to secure a result that would in no way prejudice
him.
General Issue: The Code of 1858 provided that if defendant pleaded
the general issue, he must give notice of all his real defenses whether
by way of denial or avoidance.8 At present he may plead the general
issue or a general denial, which is the equivalent of the general issueY
This means that the defenses upon which defendant may rely under
such a plea depend upon the common law form of action which would
have been used to redress the wrong alleged in the declaration; but it
is not safe to rely entirely upon the common law precedents in case,
assumpsit, replevin, detinue, or ejectment, for the Tennessee decisions,
and in some instances statutes, modify the orthodox common law
rules.10 It seems permissible for the defendant to plead both the
general issue and defenses in confession and avoidance, but it is
doubtful to what extent this procedure limits his right under the
general issue1 The Code provides that in replevin he may plead not
guilty or may plead specially. It does not permit both. Hence, if he
pleads specially, his accompanying plea of not guilty is ineffective.12
And where upon motion made by plaintiff, defendant is required to
specify his defenses, he cannot rely at all upon the general issue, but
must include in his specified defenses those in denial as well as those
in avoidance. 3 And the same seems to be true where he pleads the
general issue with notice of the special defenses upon which he in-
tends to rely, although there is no existing statute authorizing or
requiring such a practice.1 4
The text writers agree that the court is not required to order the
defendant to plead specially the defenses on which he intends to rely.
The language of the statute "may order" is obviously not mandatory.
Yet the Court of Appeals, Middle Section, has indicated a doubt in
avoiding a decision upon the point by holding that when the trial
judge required the defendant to disclose only a single defense, leaving
him free to rely upon any other defense at the trial, the error, if any,
was harmless when defendant rested without offering any evidence.,,
7. Waterhouse v. Perry, 195 Tenn. 458, 260 S.W.2d 176 (1953).
8. See West v. Taylor, 42 Tenn. 96 (1865).
9. TENN. CODE ANN. § 8765 (Williams 1934).
10. See 5 VAND. L. REV. 256 (1952) commenting on Sing v. Headrick, 34 Tenn.
App. 187, 236 S.W.2d 95 (E.S. 1950).
11. See McKay v. Louisville & Northern R.R., 133 Tenn. 590, 182 S.W. 824
(1915); Creekmore v. Woodward, 192 Tenn. 280, 241 S.W.2d 397 (1951).
12. Lillard v. Yellow VIfg. Acceptance Corp., 263 S.W.2d 520 (Tenn. 1953),
interpreting TENN. CODE ANN. § 9297 (Williams 1934).
13. Creekmore v. Woodard, 192 Tenn. 280, 241 S.W.2d 397 (1951).
14. Watts v. Town of Dickson, 260 S.W.2d 206 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1953).
15. State ex rel. George v. Fleming, 264 S.W.2d 589 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1953).
See CARUTHERS, HISTORY OF A LAwsurr § 226; (7th ed., Gilreath, 1951); HIGGINs
& CROWNOVER, TENNESSEE PROCEDURE iN LAW CASES § 566 (1937).
I
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Counterclaim: Where the facts stated in a counterclaim constitute
a claim which could be used defensively as a recoupment but which
is pleaded as a basis for affirmative relief, it cannot be interposed in an
action by a county, where the acts were done by representatives of
the county performing governmental functions.16 A party cannot pre-
vent the filing of a proper counterclaim or crossclaim in a tort action
by failing to file his declaration; and there is no requirement of a
counter-summons to be issued in such a case. T a
Replication: In a will contest where the contestant pleaded a general
denial or the general issue, the proponent had no opportunity to reply,
and consequently could rely upon the conclusive effect of a decision of
an issue of fact by an earlier decree or judgment in a former proceed-
ing between the same parties, although he had not pleaded it.
17
Amendment: Amendments before and during trial are freely al-
lowed, and the trial court's action will be reviewed only for abuse of
discretion. Thus in a personal injury action the trial judge committed
no error in allowing (1) an amendment which alleged in effect that
the defendants were joint-tortfeasors, and thus made demurrable a
plea in abatement by some of them, and (2) an amendment substitut-
ing a newly appointed administrator as a party defendant in lieu of
an administratrix who had resigned, and (3) one amendment before
trial raising the amount sued for to $100,000 and another during trial
raising it to $115,000.18 And in an election contest an amendment may
properly be allowed in the circuit court to which the proceeding has
been appealed.19 By application of the same liberal principle, an
amendment to plaintiff's affidavit in a replevin action is permitted.20
An amendment speaks from the date of the original pleading. Al-
though a new cause of action cannot be introduced by amendment
after the period of the statute of limitations has elapsed, yet an amend-
ment which merely changes the theory of liability but relies upon the
same facts is not objectionable. Thus where the original theory posited
liability on the doctrine of respondeat superior, an amendment, made
after the statutory period had expired alleging the same facts as per-
sonal negligence of the master, was properly allowed. But inexcusable
delay in seeking the right to amend or plead over will justify denial
of a motion asking such relief. For example, after the Supreme Court
has remanded a cause to the trial court with directions to proceed in
accord with an opinion which in effect overruled defendant's de-
16. Scates v. Board of Com'rs. of Union City, 265 S.W.2d 563 (Tenn. 1954).
16a. Harbison v. Welch, 195 Tenn. 191, 258 S.W.2d 755 (1953).
17. Wrinkle v. Williams, 260 S.W.2d 304 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1953); see
RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS c.3, tit. E, § 68 (1942).
18. Monday v. Millsaps, 264 S.W.2d 6 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1953).
19. Blackwood v. Hollingsworth, 195 Tenn. 427, 260 S.W.2d 164 (1953).
20. Lillard v. Yellow Mfg. Acceptance Corp., 263 S.W.2d 520 (Tenn. 1953).
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murrer, and the defendant took no action for more than ten weeks
after the remand was filed in the trial court, the chancellor did not
abuse his discretion in refusing to grant defendant additional time in
which to make his defense, particularly where defendant made no
showing as to his expected defense or his reason for asking further
delay.21 And it is no abuse of discretion to refuse to allow an amend-
ment to interpose an additional defense when motion therefor is made
after filing a motion for a new trial.21a
Equity Pleading-Theory of Pleading: Where the answer in equity
denies the case set forth in the bill, and sets up a different case, if the
plaintiff fails to recover on the case in the bill, he may recover on
the case relied upon in the answer, and if the defendant's testimony
modifies the case in the answer to plaintiff's advantage, the chancellor
may properly enter a decree for the plaintiff on the facts thus proved.
Therefore, where defendant's answer set up a relationship between
plaintiff and defendant which involved no confidence, but the latter's
testimony showed it to be a confidential relationship, the chancellor's
decree was properly based upon the violation by defendant of this
confidential relationship.22
Answer in Equity: A verified answer in equity responsive to the
bill still has its orthodox value-it can be overcome only by testimony
of two witnesses or by one witness and evidence of corroborating
circumstances. 23 Perhaps this rule, which should have no application
where witnesses in equity are on the same footing as witnesses at law
and testimony viva voce is required wherever practicable, may have
some excuse for its continued existence in a system where "the testi-
mony of witnesses shall, unless otherwise provided, be taken in writ-
ing without compelling their personal attendance." 24 It may not be
altogether impertinent to inquire how long the profession in Ten-
nessee will be satisfied with this ancient procedure after its members
have had experience under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which
require that testimony shall normally be taken orally in open court25
and which specifically abolish the orthodox rule as to the effect of
an answer under oath in equityY6
Arrest of Judgment or Non Obstante Veredicto: A motion in arrest
of judgment will not reach defects in allegations which affect the
form rather than the substance of allegations. Consequently, in a
prosecution for violating a traffic ordinance of the City of Memphis,
21. Henry v. White, 195 Tenn. 383, 259 S.W.2d 862 (1953).
21a. Buice v. Scruggs Equipment Co., 267 S.W.2d 119 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1953).
'22. Bell v. Garley, 260 S.W.2d 300 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1951).
23. Mason v. Winstead, 265 S.W.2d 561 (Tenn. 1954).
24. TENrx. CODE ANN. § 10562 (Williams 1934).
25. FED. R. Civ. P. 43.
26. FED. R. CIw. P. 11.
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which is not a criminal prosecution, and in which-technical nicety of
pleading is not required, a warrant which charged defendant with
"the offense of Vio. Sec. 1683 Exceeding the Speed ,Limit within the
City of Memphis" was sufficient against attack upon a motion in
arrest.
27
A motion for judgment non obstante veredicto "is a test of the
pleadings" and raises no question as to the sufficiency of the evidence
to sustain the verdict.
2 7 a
Parties: Speaking generally, neither the state nor one of its gov-
ernmental divisions can be made a party defendant without its con-
sent. Each is immune from liability for acts done by its agents or
servants in exercising a governmental function. Nor does either give
consent or waive immunity: by becoming a plaintiff in an action for in-
jury to its property while being used in the exercise of such a func-
tion. Hence a defendant sued for negligently injuring property in-such
circumstances may rely upon any defense based upon the wrongful
conduct of plaintiff's servants but cannot make such conduct the basis
of a counterclaim.28 It is too late to raise a question as to the proper
parties after the case has been submitted to the chancellor for de-
cision.
2 8a
RamIEs
Certiorari: The common law writ of certiorari which, at least in
Tennessee, was applicable in civil as well as in criminal cases, is pre-
served in the Constitution of Tennessee; and the Supreme Court, Jus-
tice Tomlinson alone dissenting, has held that it cannot be enlarged
so as to require or permit the courts to review the action of non-
judicial -tribunals as in an equity appeal. The court can re-examine
the proceedings only to determine whether the tribunal acted arbi-
trarily, fraudulently or illegally; the court cannot constitutionally
weigh the evidence and make findings according to what it determines
to be the preponderance of the evidence. 9 Likewise, the review of the
action of a county beer board upon a matter within its jurisdiction is
limited to an inquiry whether its findings are supported by substantial
evidence.30 The same is true as to the review of a decision of a tax
equalization board.31 But this restricted scope of review does not
27. Guidi v. City of Memphis, 263 S.W.2d 532 (Tenn. 1953).
27a. Buice v. Scruggs Equipment Co., 267 S.W.2d 119 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1953).
28. Scates v. Board of Com'rs. of Union City, 265 S.W.2d 563 (Tenn. 1954).
28a. Crass v. Walls, 259 S.W.2d 670 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1953).
29. Hoover Motor Express Co. v. Railroad & Public Utilities Commission,
261 S.W.2d 233 (1953). The proper scope of the writ is fully discussed in
195 Tenn. 593, 261 S.W.2d 233 (1953). The proper scope of the writ is fully
discussed in Conners v. City of Knoxville, 136 Tenn. 428, 189 S.W. 870 (1916).
30. Caylor v. Butler, 263 S.W.2d 500 (Tenn. 1953).
31. Browning v. Alabama Great Southern R. Co.; 195 Tenn. 252, 259 S.W.2d
154 (1953).
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apply to statutory certiorari to review a judgment of a juvenile court.
Such a court of a county is inferior to the circuit court and the circuit
court of that county has appellate jurisdiction. Where there is no
provision for appeal, the statutory writ will issue and the case will
be retried de novo upon the merits; it is the equivalent of an appeal
from a magistrate's court.
3 2
Certiorari is a proper remedy to correct abuse of process by a
sheriff in levying upon exempt goods, but the petition must state facts
showing that the goods are exempt, either by specific description or
by reason of facts set forth in the statute as entitling the petitioner
to have the goods set aside as exempt.33 And when, on the hearing of
the petition, certiorari is denied, judgment in favor of the judgment
creditor should be entered for the amount of the judgment, interest
and costs. 34 But where a civil service employee is summarily dis-
charged by the device of abolishing his office and recreating it under
another name, a statute providing that certiorari is the exclusive
remedy in the nature of an appeal from a ruling of a city board or
official concerning the civil service status of an individual has no ap-
plication. Since there was no preferment of charges or hearing, there
was no record to review. The employee's remedy is by mandamus for
reinstatement with back pay.35 And where a petitioner, who has been
cited by a circuit judge and a criminal court judge to show cause why
he should not be punished for a contempt, seeks review of the order
by the Supreme Court by certiorari and supersedeas, his petition is
premature when made before hearing and final judgment.30
Contempt Proceedings: An interesting question was raised but not
decided in Gilbreath v. Ferguson 7 A circuit judge and a criminal
court judge enjoined a named company and individual from making
bonds in general sessions court at Kingsport. Judge Gilbreath of that
court continued to approve bonds made by these enjoined parties, and
was ordered to show cause why he should not be punished for con-
tempt. The Supreme Court indulging the assumption that the in-
junction was authorized said: "If this authority should be exercised
in the case at bar and the General Sessions Judge committed to jail for
criminal contempt for taking bonds of the said bonding company,
would it not result in closing the court for any and all purposes? The
said judge could hardly be expected to hold court in the jail house of
Sullivan County. These questions are yet to be answered if and when
32. Doster v. State, 195 Tenn. 535, 260 S.W.2d 279 (1953).
33. Keen v. Alexander, 195 Tenn. 564, 260 S.W.2d 297 (1953).
34. Ibid.
35. State ex rel. Paylor v. City of Knoxville, 195 Tenn. 318, 259 S.W.2d 537
1953).
36. Gilbreath v. Fergusom, 195 Tenn. 528, 260 S.W.2d 276 (1953).
37. Ibid.
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the General Sessions Judge has been adjudged in contempt by the
respondents."33
Declaratory Judgment: Where a government agency has contracted
to indemnify a county against claims for damages for obstructing
highways and the like, and persons who will be affected by closing a
highway by the agency are uncertain as to their rights and remedies,
an action for a declaratory judgment may be maintained.sa
Habeas Corpus: A person who is confined pursuant to a judgment
of a court erected in violation of the Constitution of Tennessee is con-
fined under a judgment that is absolutely void, and is entitled to re-
lease on habeas corpus. The Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court
established by the Mayor and City Council of Nashville was created
in violation of Article VI, Sections 1, 4 of the Constitution. Hence, a
person confined pursuant to its judgment is entitled to be released.39
Mandamus: This is the proper remedy of a civil service employee
who has been summarily discharged contrary to law and who is en-
titled to be reinstated.
40
PRESUMPTIONS
The Tennessee courts continue to use the term presumption without
precise definition. It is clear that when the basic fact is established
and there is no evidence tending to prove the non-existence of the
presumed fact, the trier of fact must find the existence of the presumed
fact. Accordingly it was said in Morrow v. Person,1 that the pre-
sumption that the subscribing witness to a will signed in the presence
of the testator is conclusive in the absence of contrary evidence. In
Edgemon v. State4 2 the presumption of regularity of judicial proceed-
ings was relied upon as establishing that the defendant was advised
as to his right to counsel in the absence of anything in the record in-
dicating otherwise; and in Pruitt v. Cantrell43 this presumption es-
tablished the validity of a judgment of a court of a justice of the peace,
which was for an amount apparently beyond its jurisdiction. The pre-
sumption that the husband owned intoxicating liquor found in the
family home was said to disappear "when there are facts and circum-
stances refuting the presumption, or at least it becomes a jury ques-
tion to decide who owns the liquor." Earlier in the opinion the court
indicated that the presumption could be overcome "by proof of circum-
38. Ibid.
38a. Stewart v. Sullivan County, 264 S.W.2d 17 (Tenn. 1953).
39. State ex. rel. Haywood v. Superintendent, Davidson County Workhouse,
195 Tenn. 265, 259 S.W.2d 159 (1953).
40. See note 35 supra.
41. 195 Tenn. 370, 259 S.W.2d 665 (1953).
42. 195 Tenn. 496, 260 S.W.2d 262 (1953).
43. 264 S.W.2d 793 (Tenn. 1954).
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stances indicating a possession on the part of the wife."44 The results
in these cases are in accord with the Thayer theory which is approved
by Wigrnore and the American Law Institute. By that theory the sole
effect of a presumption is to put upon the party asserting the non-
existence of the presumed fact the burden of seeing to it that there
is introduced sufficient evidence to justify a finding of such non-
existence. In the first two cases there was no such evidence; in the
last the state had both the burden of introducing evidence and the
burden of persuading the jury that the wife had possession. The
evidence showing that it was found in the home was not enough be-
cause that raised the presumption of ownership and possession in the
husband. The additional evidence as to the exact place where found
and the conduct of the wife was sufficient to justify a finding of her
possession; that satisfied the only burden created by the presumption,
and left the case to be decided as if there had never been any pre-
sumption in the case. On the evidence, the question of her possession
was for the jury.
EVIDENCE
Objection: Although Tennessee has a rather unique practice which
permits a party deliberately to withhold objection to inadmissible
evidence and then insist on having it stricken at any time before sub-
mission of the case to the trier,45 yet it applies the generally accepted
doctrine that an objection to the reception in evidence of a document
which contains both admissible and inadmissible material is ineffec-
tive; the objection must be limited to the inadmissable material.40 It
is believed that the same procedure would be required with reference
to an objection to oral testimony.47
Exclusion for Reasons of Extrinisic Policy: Evidence that a defend-
ant is insured against loss for liability for his conduct is inadmissable
as tending to prove his conduct blameworthy, but where it is relevant
upon another issue, as where it tends to show a relevant relationship
between the insured and another, it is receivable. The jury should
be warned that it is not to be used on the issue of negligence.
48
Impeaching a Verdict: Where four cases were consolidated for trial
and the jury returned a separate verdict for the defendant in each,
testimony by three of the jurors to the effect that no verdict was
reached in one of the four is inadmissible since the bill of exceptions
shows that the jurors in reporting in each case stated that they had
agreed upon the verdict. 49 And jurors cannot be heard to impeach
44. Morrison v. State, 263 S.W.2d 504 (Tenn. 1953).
45. See Caruthers, History of a Lawsuit § 336 (7th ed Gilreath, 1951).
46. Monday v. Millsaps, 264 S.W.2d 6 (Tenn. App. E.. 1953).
47. Cf. Miller v. State, 80 Tenn. 223 (1883).
48. Olson v. Sharpe, 259 S.W.2d 867 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1953).
49. Davidson v. Barger, 259 S.W.2d 541 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1953).
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their verdict by testifying that they were influenced in reaching it by
a misunderstanding of the law as a result of the argument of counsel
and the trial judge's ruling and instructions thereon.50 Cases of this
sort are to be sharply distinguished from those involving the privilege
of a juror to have his deliberations and votes in the jury room kept
secret.51
Photographs: The trial judge has a large discretion in ruling upon
the admissibility of photographs of the place in which a relevant event
occurred. Where the evidence indicates that an offered photograph
does not represent the place in the same condition as it was at the time
the event occurred, his ruling excluding the photograph will not be
disturbed on appeal.
52
Opinion: See Expert Witness, infra p. 908.
Illegally Obtained: In applying the Tennessee rule that evidence
secured by violation of the constitutional prohibition against un-
reasonable search and seizure is inadmissible, the Supreme Court has
held in effect that a properly issued warrant loses its efficacy after one
search has been conducted under its authority. Consequently goods
discovered and seized in a second search under the same warrant are
inadmissible in evidence, although nothing was taken in the earlier
search.5 3 The prohibition does not apply to prevent seizure of contra-
band packages left by defendant in a yard beside the house of an-
other.54 A person may agree in advance to a search which would
otherwise be forbidden, and he does so with respect to a search of his
automobile for illegally taken game by accepting a hunting license,
even though the automobile has reached a point outside the hunting
area on its return therefrom.55 This seems an eminently fair and
sound result. Where a person whose property has been seized and
forfeited as contraband seeks to have it returned, and in the proceed-
ing admits that the property was being used in the course of conduct
which made it contraband, he is not entitled to the return of his
property. This, of course, is an entirely different question from that
of admissibility in evidence of the property wrongfully seized. For
example, if it is illegal to possess certain articles and they are seized
in violation of the constitutional provision, there is no reason why a
court should sanction their further illegal possession by requiring
50. Garner v. State ex tel. Askins, 266 S.W.2d 358 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1953).
51. See Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 53 Sup. Ct. 465, 77 L. Ed. 993
(1933).
52. Strickland Transportation Co. v. Douglas, 264 S.W.2d 233 (Tenn. App.
W.S. 1953).
53. McDonald v. State, 195 Tenn. 282, 259 S.W,2d 524 (1953).
54. Templeton v. State, 264 S.W.2d 565 (Tenn. 1954).
55. Hughes v. State, 195 Tenn. 290, 259 S.W.2d 527 (1953).
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them to be returned. The same reasoning may justify refusal to re-
turn a vehicle which transported the illegal article if the offense con-
sists of transporting it, but that is somewhat more difficult to justify
for possession of the vehicle is not an offense, and the right to con-
fiscate it depends upon evidence which was secured as a consequence
of the prohibited search, even if not by using the wrongfully seized
article as evidence. Yet it seems settled law in Tennessee that if the
owner of the vehicle in which the contraband was taken by wrongful
search and seizure admits possession of the contraband, the fact that
it was taken in violation of his constitutional right does not entitle
him to the return of the vehicle. 6 The precedents upon which this
doctrine is based put further limits upon the protection afforded an
accused. As explained in Kelley v. State5 7 they stand for the doctrine
that error in admitting evidence secured by unlawful search and
seizure will not work a reversal of a conviction if there is "independent
evidence elicited either from the defendant or elsewhere which of
itself is sufficient to justify a conviction." There is, as yet, no attempt
to define "independent evidence." Will it include evidence discovered
by using the wrongfully seized material as a clue, or must it come
from a wholly independent source? Is the accused's testimony in
attempting to have the illegally secured evidence suppressed or to
regain possession of the fotfeited vehicle independent evidence, or
should it be characterized as "a fruit of the poisonous tree?"''
In connection with all rulings on evidence it must be kept in mind
that in order to secure a reversal on appeal, it must affirmatively ap-
pear that an error duly excepted to and preserved for review was
prejudicial. Hence if the trial judge charges the jury to disregard
evidence erroneously received or if a special verdict or finding makes
it clear that the fact which the inadmissible evidence tends to prove
is immaterial, the error is harmless9
Parol Evidence Rule: The Restatement of Contracts provides in
Section 228: "An agreement is integrated where the parties thereto
adopt a writing or writings as the final and complete expression of
the agreement. An integration is the writing or writings so adopted,"
and Section 237 declares that "the integration of an agreement makes
inoperative to add to or to vary the agreement all contemporaneous
oral agreements relating to the same subject matter." Section 229
says that if a writing interpreted according to the usual standards does
not appear to be an integration of a part only but to be an integration
56. Dickinson v. Ross, 264 S.W.2d 800 (Tenn. 1954).
57. 184 Tenn. 143, 197 S.W.2d 545 (1946).
58. Cf. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 40 Sup. Ct.
182, 64 L. Ed. 319 (1920); Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341, 60 Sup.
Ct. 266, 84 L. Ed. 307 (1939).
59. Olson v. Sharpe, 259 S.W.2d 867 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1953).
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of the whole, it is subject to the rule as a complete and final expression
of the whole contract. In such a situation evidence of inconsistent
oral agreements contemporaneous with the making of the writing or
writings is inadmissible. The application of these generalizations to
commercial transactions presents difficult problems. In Seaton v.
Dye,60 a grantor and four grantees executed the following writings:
(1) a warranty deed by the grantor to the grantees, (2) a note for
$6,000 and a mortgage trust deed of the granted property by the
grantees to Cumberland College, (3) a series of notes and a second
mortgage trust deed by grantees-to grantor for $7500. The chancellor
found as a fact that at the time of the execution of these documents
the grantor and grantees orally agreed that the grantor and grantees
would cooperate in efforts to negotiate a sale of the property to other
persons; that if successful in negotiating a sale at a price more than
sufficient to pay the first mortgage debt of $6000 and the second mort-
gage notes, the surplus would be divided between them five ways, each
to receive one-fifth of the surplus; that if unsuccessful in negotiating
a sale for an amount sufficient to pay both indebtednesses, the grantor
would not seek or be entitled to hold the grantees or any of them,
for any deficiency on said second mortgage indebtedness. The action
by the grantor against the grantees was to recover a deficiency judg-
ment contrary to the express terms of this oral agreement. The court
held that the oral agreement contradicted the writings and was
totally ineffective and evidence thereof was inadmissible. Obviously
the oral agreement was directly contrary to the terms of the notes
secured by the second mortgage; obviously also the writings were a
complete integration of the transaction between the grantees and
Cumberland College. But as between the other parties to this under-
taking, the parts of the agreement as to resale and division of profits
were nothing unusual and the agreement might well fall within
Williston's suggested test, "whether the parties so situated generally
would or might do so."'61 And this is reasonable because the side agree-
ment does not contradict or modify the writing. But the note and
mortgage on their face are complete agreements covering this par-
ticular part of the transaction, and the decision is in accord with the
great majority of decisions dealing with promises to pay money.62
It is a generally accepted rule that a recital of consideration in a deed
may be shown to be false and that the real consideration may be
proved by parol. The recital is often explained as intended only as
an acknowledgment of receipt and not part of the agreement; a refer-
ence to an extrinsic matter and therefore subject to be proved
wherever relevant. Accordingly Where a deed which reserved a life
60. 263 S.W.2d 544 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1953).
61. 3 WMWsTO, CONTRACTS § 638 (Rev. ed. 1936).
62. See 3 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 587 nn. 45, 46 (1951).
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estate to the grantor recited a receipt of $3000 as consideration, it was
proper to show that no money was paid and that the real consideration
was an agreement to support the grantors during their lives while on
the granted property. 3 It is also an established doctrine in most
jurisdictions that a conveyance by a deed absolute on its face may be
shown by oral evidence to be a mortgage.6 4 It is likewise well settled
in Tennessee that an oral agreement to hold in trust land conveyed
by a general warranty deed is valid and effective6  The various at-
tempts to explain why these results are not direct violations of the
parol evidence rule require unusual mental gymnastic ability. The
fact remains that the courts in these instances receive and give effect
to parol evidence which proves that a writing apparently complete on
its face is only a partial integration of a larger transaction, and which
does contradict a specific term of the writing.
Ambiguity, Patent and Latent: The courts of Tennessee, like many
others, have had their trouble with Lord Bacon's maxim which forbids
the use of oral evidence to explain or resolve a patent ambiguity. In
Anderson v. Sharp66 a writing signed by two members of a church
read in part: "We undersigned agree to pay A. D. Lee" (etc. for
services in giving a certain program). "It is further understood that
the program is under the auspices of the church." When Lee sued for
breach of the signers' agreement, they insisted that they had signed
only as agents for the church. The court found the writing ambiguous
and permitted defendants to prove by oral evidence that they were to
incur no personal liability. It is interesting to contrast this decision
with that in Lazarof v. Klyce,67 and to note that the assumption that
such an ambiguity patent on the face of the instrument is a condition
of admissibility of the oral evidence. In White v. Kaminsky, 8 how-
ever, the court began its discussion of the applicable law with the flat
assertion that parol evidence is inadmissible to resolve a patent am-
biguity; it is admissible only to resolve a latent ambiguity. The note
in question and the accompanying mortgage or trust deed was for
$1025 with interest at 6% from a specified date, payable in instalments
of $50 each on the 12th day of each month with the terminating date
so fixed as to require twenty-two payments. The specified sum and
interest amounted to $1084.15-the required instalments amounted
to $1100. The court solemnly declared without detailed explanation
that the ambiguity was latent, and that parol evidence was admissible
63. Goodwin v. Goodwin, 260 S.W.2d 186 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1953).
64. See 9 WiGmom, EViDENCE § 2437 and cases in n. 1 (3d ed. 1940).
65. Ibid. But note that the Statute of Frauds may make an oral agreement
ineffective.
66. 195 Tenn. 274, 259 S.W.2d 521 (1953).
67. 195 Tenn. 27, 255 S.W.2d 11 (1953), commented on in 6 VAND. L. REv.
1028, 1144 (1953).
68. 264 S.W.2d 813 (Tenn. 1954).
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to show that the real agreement was for $1025 and 6% interest only.
Of course, the decision is clearly correct. The parol evidence rule does
not exclude evidence that a mistake was made in reducing the agree-
ment to writing, and it is fairly obvious that the parties either in com-
puting the amount or in fixing the terminating date made a clerical
mistake. Furthermore, as to the total amount to be paid the writing
produces an uncertainty or ambiguity of such a character as to call
for parol evidence under Section 231 of the Restatement of Contracts.
And finally where one construction of an instrument would make it
illegal (here for usury) and the other will make it valid, the latter will
prevail. But it approaches absurdity to designate such an ambiguity
as latent. Williston says that Bacon's maxim has sometimes been
applied to written contracts and agreements, but that it has chiefly
given trouble in the interpretation of wills. "Certainly so far as con-
tracts and agreements are concerned, it may be wholly disregarded."
The Restatement of Contracts entirely disregards the maxim. It is
high time that the Tennessee Court do likewise, and thus avoid the
necessity of verbal juggling. As to wills the court listens to all evi-
dence as to the testator's situation, his °personal relations and the
subject matter to be devised, and construes the will in the light of
all these circumstances. This may result in what the court may call
reforming the will (an obviously impossible procedure), but which is
merely giving it a reasonable construction. 9
Judicial Notice: The current Tennessee decisions as to judicial
notice are generally orthodox. Courts of general jurisdiction do not
ordinarily judicially notice municipal ordinances but they may do so
when in the territorial jurisdiction of the court it is a matter of com-
mon knowledge.or notoriety.70 In the category of matters so commonly
known as to be indisputable are (1) the facts that in Tennessee cities
of the size of Chattanooga the police have and use short wave radios
and that persons engaged in the business of towing wrecked auto-
mobiles get information of wrecks by tuning in on the short wave,
and rush to the scene; [These judicially noticed facts are pertinent in
considering the validity of city ordinances regulating the conduct of
that business.] 71 (2) that a deranged patient in a hospital should be
watched if put in a place where he might harm himself;7 2 and (3) that
the residue left in tanks used to store petroleum products is explosive.78
Under the relevant Uniform Judicial Notice Act, Tennessee courts
take judicial notice that Indiana has adopted a statute similar to the
69. Greer v. Anderson, 259 S.W.2d 550 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1953).
70. Guidi v. City of Memphis, 263 S.W.2d 532 (Tenn. 1953).
71. City of Chattanooga v. Fanburg, 265 S.W.2d 15 (Tenn. 1954).
72. Rural Education Ass'n v. Anderson, 261 S.W.2d 151 (Tenm App. M.S.
1953).
73. Gatlinburg Const. Co. v. McKinney, 263 S.W.2d 765 (Tenn. App. E.S.
1953).
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Uniform Reciprocal Support Act which is adopted in Tennessee,
authorizing the Governor to order extradition of an accused even
though the act constituting the offense was done outside the state
seeking accused's rendition.74 But it is distinctly unorthodox for a
state court to declare that it will not take judicial notice of an ap-
plicable regulation promulgated under the Defense Production Act of
1950. The decision in which the court asserted its refusal was amply
justified because it was first brought to the court's attention in a mo-
tion for a new trial in which the regulation was claimed to be newly
discovered evidence.7
4 a
WINESSES
Preferred Witness: Tennessee accepts the orthodox view that when
an attesting witness to a will is shown to be dead, his attestation may
be proved by testimony as to his handwriting and signature. 75 This
is in effect using the hearsay statement of the attester as evidence
that the testator signed in his presence, although the hearsay quality
of the evidence is rarely mentioned if indeed it is recognized. There
is and should be no question that if an attester who is present and
verifies his signature does not remember the details of so doing, testi-
fies that he would not have signed unless he had done so in the pres-
ence of the testator and at his request, his testimony will justify a
finding of proper attestation by him. 76
Qualification of Witness for Opinion: The qualification of a witness
as an expert in determining the speed of a motor vehicle from skid-
marks is to be decided by the trial judge. The subject matter is proper
for expert opinion evidence.77 The owner of a chattel is competent to
testify to its value.78
Impeachment: Tennessee seems to accept the orthodox view that
prohibits a party from impeaching his own witness, but it makes the
usual limitation that the forbidden impeachment does not include
evidence tending to prove the non-existence of the fact the existence
of which the witness has asserted. Thus where the witness testified
that he had no interest in a corporation, the party presenting him was
permitted to introduce corporate records showing the contrary, and
to prove the authenticity of the records by testimony of the witness
himself.79 The jury should not be instructed that they may disregard
74. State ex rel. Bryant v. Fleming, 195 Tenn. 419, 260 S.W.2d 161 (1953).
74a. Buice v. Scruggs Equipment Co., 267 S.W.2d 119 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1953).
75. Morrow v. Person, 195 Tenn. 370, 259 S.W.2d 665 (1953).
76. Ibid.
77. Monday v. Millsaps, 264 S.W.2d 6 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1953). The opinion
furnishes a good example of the method of demonstrating expertness on this
subject.
78. McKinnon v. Michaud, 260 S.W.2d 721 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1953).
79. Gillespie v. Federal Compress & Warehouse Co., 265 S.W.2d 21 (Tenn.
App. W.S. 1953).
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all of the testimony of a witness if they find that he has testified falsely
as to any material fact. That is not a proper statement of the falsus in
uno doctrine.8 0
Effect of Failure to Cal: Failure to call a witness so circumstanced
as to be friendly to a party is the basis for an inference that, if called,
his testimony would be unfavorable. Thus, when a physician who had
examined plaintiff at defendant's request was not called by defendant,
it was a fair inference that his testimony would corroborate that of
plaintiff's physician.8 '
TRIAL
Jurisdiction over Person-Service of Process: No service of sum-
mons upon a party plaintiff is necessary when defendant files a proper
cross-claim.8 2 By Section 8575 of the Code an action is begun by suing
out summons whether or not it is executed. Actions for personal injury
must be brought within one year, but this does not mean that service of
process must be made within the year. Under Section 8671 a non-
resident motorist may be served by service upon the Secretary of
State, and since this service can always be made regardless of whether
the motorist is within or without the state, his absence from the state
does not toll the statute under Section 8581.83 There is nothing in
Section 8671 which otherwise affects the running of the statutory
period. But there is a definite limitation upon the right to serve the
Secretary of State. By the fiction of making the Secretary the de-
fendant's agent for service of process and limiting the duration of the
agency to one year, service made after the year even in a pending
action is unauthorized and ineffectual. In other words, this privilege of
subjecting the non-resident personally to the jurisdiction of the Ten-
nessee courts while he is without its territorial borders is strictly
limited by the terms of the statute which creates it. 8 4 If the Secretary
were the real agent of the non-resident, it would be immaterial to the
validity of the service whether the Secretary notified the defendant,
but a statute of this sort which fails to require such a notice is un-
constitutional.s5
Incidentally, the Supreme Court has held that the Secretary's in-
dorsement upon the original process has the same effect as the return
of the sheriff.8  It is unimpeachable. In Tennessee the common law
rule prevails, that a party to an action cannot in that action be heard
80. McKinnon v. Michaud, 260 S.W.2d 721 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1953).
81. White v. Seier, 264 S.W.2d 241 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1953). See also Strick-
land Transportation Co. v. Douglas, 264 S.W.2d 233 (Tenn. App W.S. 1953).
82. Harbison v. Welch, 195 Tenn. 191, 258 S.W.2d 755 (1953).
83. Arrowood County v. McMinn, 173 Tenn. 562, 121 S.W.2d 566 (1938). All
references to the Code are to TENjs. Coos ANN. (Williams 1934).
84. Tabor v. Mason Dixon Lines, Inc., 264 S.W.2d 821 (1954).
85. Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13, 48 Sup, Ct. 259, 72 L. Ed. 446 (1928).
86. Tabor v. Mason Dixon Lines, Inc., 264 S.W.2d 821 (1954).
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to impeach the sheriff's return. His remedy at law is an action against
the sheriff for a false return. But in an action in equity he may attack
a judgment as having been rendered without jurisdiction over his
person. The attack is on the basis that the judgment is utterly void,
not that the defendant was prevented from interposing a defense, for
he need not allege or prove that he had or has a defense.87 The federal
courts have not allowed an attack on the marshal's return even in
equity, and the majority of the state courts which do allow such an
attack require the defendant to show that he has a good defense.88
Service upon a defendant by publication in a divorce action is in-
sufficient to support a judgment for alimony and support money, but
a defendant may confer jurisdiction retroactively by acquiescence or
by estoppel, as where he complies with the judgment in order to
escape contempt proceedings while he is within the state or in order
to avoid prosecution for desertion after having been brought into
the state by extradition proceedingsP
Jurisdiction of Subject Matter-Ecclesiastical Matters: A court of
equity has no jurisdiction to order or conduct an election of a pastor
of a church. The removal of an incumbent pastor and the election of
his successor are purely ecclesiastical functions.0
Local Actions: Actions for damage to, or to determine the validity
of a deed covering, real property are local actions, and must be brought
in the county in which the realty is located, and while a court of equity
has power to enjoin a defendant who is personally before it from do-
ing acts outside the territorial jurisdiction, it cannot do so where the
injunction can be granted only by determining the title to realty out-
side the territory.01
Divorce: A court cannot by a decree deprive itself of its statutory
power to modify a provision for support of wife and child. Conse-
quently a decree which accepts and includes the provisions of the
agreement of the parties as to a payment "in lieu of any further sup-
port or maintenance for" the wife and child cannot prevent the court
upon a proper showing from later making a different provision for
support and maintenance. 2
Venue-Distinguished from Jurisdiction: The statutory provisions
for bringing divorce actions in specified counties, as applied to resi-
87. Ridgeway v. Bank of Tennessee, 30 Tenn. 522 (1851), followed in Myers
v. Wolf, 162 Tenn. 42, 34 S.W.2d 201 (1931).
88. See text and cases in 3 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 1229, pp. 2556-2561 (5th
ed. 1925).
89. Chappell v. Chappell, 261 S.W.2d 824 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1952).
90. Mason v. Winstead, 265 S.W.2d 561 (Tenn. 1954).
91. Carter v. Brown, 263 S.W.2d 757 (Tenn. 1953).
92. Doty v. Doty, 260 S.W.2d 411 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1952).
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dents, governs venue only. They do not affect the jurisdiction of the
subject matter. Hence even a proceeding which directly attacks as
void a judgment because rendered in a county in which neither party
resided must failYs
Venue-Generally: A defendant who files a cross-claim in an action
in a county other than that of his residence waives his right to object
to the venue.
94
The provision of Public Acts 1953, c. 34, that in tort actions, where
parties are residents of the state but reside in different counties, the
action may be brought in the county where the cause of action arose
applies to causes which arose before the passage of the Act as well as
to those which arose thereafter 9 5
Justice's Court: Where a party brings replevin in a court of a justice
of the peace and in his bond makes no allegation of the value of the
chattel replevied, he cannot later claim that its value was in excess
of, the then applicable statutory limit of the court's jurisdiction in
replevin actions. The judgment also will be so interpreted as to sus-
tain jurisdiction, when any excess may be explained as due to accrued
interest or costs or both.9 6
Loss by Appeal: The chancellor has no power to rehear a cause after
an appeal from his decree to the Court of Appeals has been perfected.
97
Consolidation for Trial: Where four pending cases all grew out of
the same collision of automobiles, the trial judge may in the .exercise
of a sound discretion order them consolidated for trial. His ruling will
not be interfered with unless it is made to appear that the joint trial
resulted in prejudice to a complaining party98
Right to Counsel: Where two defendants in a criminal case went to
trial without counsel, and the record is silent as to whether each was
advised as to his right to counsel but shows that one defendant con-
ducted an intelligent cross-examination of witnesses with respect to his
own case and that of his codefendant, the conviction should be af-
firmed.90 The presumption of regularity prevails to indicate that each
was so advised, and the record shows that absence of counsel wag ap-
parently not prejudicial.
Right to Jury: If a party to a civil action does not demand trial by
jury in his pleadings or does not make his demand and have entry
93. Kelley v. Kelley, 263 S.W.2d 505 (Tenn. 1953).
94. Harbison v. Welch, 195 Tenn. 191, 258 S.W.2d 755 (1953).
95. Dowlen v. Fitch, 226 S.W.2d 357 (Tenn. 1954).
96. Pruitt v. Cantrell, 264 S.W.2d 793 (Tenn. 1954).
97. First State Bank v. Stacey, 261 S.W.2d 245 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1953).
98. Davidson v. Burger, 259 S.W.2d 541 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1953).
99. Edgemon v. State, 195 Tenn. 496, 260 S.W.2d 262 (1953).
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thereof made on the record on the first day of the trial term, he waives
his right to a jury. In a will contest the proceeding in circuit court is
a new action and the demand must be made therein. In the absence of
such a demand, it is error to try the case by jury, but if the verdict is
set aside and a new trial ordered, the error is cured. 0 0 Where a cause
is removed to the circuit court from the juvenile court by certiorari
and defendant is entitled to a trial de novo, he is also entitled to trial
by jury as in any criminal case.' 0 '
Right to Jury in Chancery: The chancellor may of his own motion
empanel a jury after the hearing is begun and before the evidence is
completed, in which event the findings of the jury are advisory only.
10 2
Where a party demands a trial by jury in chancery, his right thereto
is governed by statute,0 3 for there is in Tennessee no common law
or constitutional right to an action properly brought in equity.' 0 ' In
Doughty v. Grills-'0 the court gave extended consideration to the
interpretation of the limiting provisions of the statute, "save in cases
involving complicated accounting . . .and those elsewhere excepted
by law or by provisions of this Code." The action was for an injunction
against solicitation by laymen of legal business for attorneys at law,
and the court focused attention upon the phrase, "elsewhere excepted
by law." That phrase was said to confer no right to trial by jury in any
action in which it was not a matter of right at common law at the time
of the adoption of the Constitution. The holding that the verdict of the
jury was advisory only was not essential to the decision, for there
were other grounds stated upon which it could properly have been
upheld. The history of the statute and the former cases interpreting it
are fully discussed in a note in this Review.106 The conclusion of the
court is supported by implication in the decisions that the findings in
a chancery cause, approved by the chancellor, have the same effect as
a jury verdict in a law court.106a
It remains only to observe that if the interpretation of the court is
correct, except for actions for unliquidated damages to person or
property, the Court of Chancery in Tennessee is, for all practical pur-
poses, functioning in the same manner as a so-called Code Court in a
jurisdiction in which the distinctions between actions at law and suits
in equity are abolished. This raises the query whether the time is not
100. Wrinkle v. Williams, 260 S.W.2d 304 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1953).
101. Doster v. State, 195 Tenn. 535, 260 S.W.2d 279 (1953).
102. Lawson v. Cooper, 263 S.W.2d 763 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1953).
103. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 10574-10580 (Williams 1934).
104. This is not to say that there is no such right of a defendant where the
action in chancery is one which in the absence of statute could be entertained
only in a court of law.
105. 260 S.W.2d 379 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1952).
106. 7 VAD. L. REV. 393 (1954).
106a. Buice v. Scruggs Equipment Co., 267 S.W.2d 119, 122 (Tenn. App. E.S.
1953).
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near at hand, if not already here, when Tennessee should seriously con-
sider the adoption of a system like that provided in the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. If the right to trial by jury is the same in circuit
court and chancery, and if a litigant may maintain his action in either
court, why the expense of maintaining two systems, and why the
burden upon practitioners of learning one method of procedure for
use in state courts and another for use in the federal courts?
Qualifications of Jurors: A juror is not disqualified to serve in an
action for damages for personal injuries merely because he has pre-
viously served in other actions of the same kind.10 7 Even if a juror,
who has been examined by the court and found eligible, but who has
been peremptorily challenged by defendant, is through innocent mis-
take of court and counsel called later and permitted to serve through-
out the trial, the verdict will not be set aside. The error is harmless. 0 8
When a trial is begun anew after adding a new defendant, and a
number of jurors already called and found eligible are treated as if
recalled, such jurors as are not challenged by either defendant are
competent members of the jury.10 9
Voluntary Nonsuit: After the judge has announced that he is sus-
taining defendant's motion for a directed verdict made at the close of
plaintiff's evidence, it is too late for plaintiff to take a voluntary non-
suit. The judge may proceed and order the jury to return a verdict for
defendant." 0 Likewise in such a situation a judgment of dismissal
entered against plaintiff estops him from maintaining a new action.,"
Motion for Directed Verdict: The error, if any, in denying defend-
ant's motion for a directed verdict made at the close of plaintiff's
evidence is waived when defendant presents evidence. If the motion
is renewed at the close of all the evidence, it is to be considered as if
the former motion had not been made. 1 2
Charge to Jury: Where a request to charge the jury is inaccurate" 3
or is so drawn that its conditional clause requires a finding for which
there is no support in the evidence, it is properly refused.1 4 But where
the judge submits an issue upon which there is no substantial evidence,
the error is harmless if the general verdict is supported by evidence
upon issues properly submitted."1 And where a jury returns into
107. Monday v. Millsaps, 264 S.W.2d 6 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1953).
108. England v. State, 264 S.W.2d 815 (Tenn. 1954).
109. Ibid.
110. O'Brien v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 259 S.W.2d 554 (Tenn. App.
M.S. 1953).
111. Patterson v. Ridenour, 263 S.W.2d 537 (Tenn. 1953).
112. City of Memphis v. Uselton, 260 S.W.2d 293 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1953).
113. McKinnon v. Michaud, 260 S.W.2d 721 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1953).
114. Monday v. Millsaps, 264 S.W.2d 6 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1953).
115. Shew v. Bailey, 260 S.W.2d 362 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1951).
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open court and requests further instructions and the trial judge com-
plies with the request, he may, after exceptions taken thereto, recall
the jury of his own motion to correct or amplify his previous instruc-
tions.11 6 Where instructions as given are merely inadequate or in-
complete, a party in order to predicate error thereon must call the
matter to the court's attention and request further instructions.lnoa
Verdict or Finding: A general verdict for plaintiff is not vitiated
when there is sufficient evidence to support a single count, even though
other counts which there was no evidence to support were submitted to
the jury. This, of course, is contrary to the orthodox rule, which pro-
ceeds on the theory that it is impossible to determine upon which
count the jury based its verdict. The Tennessee theory is that the
general verdict is the equivalent of a separate verdict for the same
party on each count."
7
In a criminal contempt proceeding tried by the chancellor for wrong-
ful interference with the execution of the chancellor's orders in an
adoption proceeding, the chancellor acts as both judge and jury. His
finding cannot be disturbed on review if supported by substantial
evidence, and his is the function of determining the credibility of the
witnesses.
11 8
Inconsistent Verdicts: Verdicts which exonerate an employee and
charge his employer with responsibility for the employee's conduct
under the doctrine of respondeat superior are inconsistent. But a
special verdict charging the employer with responsibility for his
personal negligence in failing to provide a watchman to give warning
of the conduct of his operations is not inconsistent with a verdict
finding the employee not guilty of negligence during the operations.
Even if the employee were guilty of negligently performing the work,
the employer has no ground of complaint if the finding that the em-
ployer's failure to provide the watchman was a proximate cause of
plaintiff's injury is supported by substantial evidence.110
Polling the Jury: The trial judge or clerk should poll the jury in a
criminal case upon demand by the defendant; but it is not reversible
error for him to instruct counsel for defendant to do so himself. If
counsel fails or refuses to comply, the defendant has no ground of
complaint.1
20
116. Monday v. Millsaps, 264 S.W.2d 6 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1953).
116a. Buice v. Scruggs Equipment Co., 267 S.W.2d 119 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1953).
117. Monday v. Millsaps, 264 S.W.2d 6 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1953)' Shew v.
Bailey, 260 S.W.2d 362 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1951); White v. Seier, 264 S.W.2d 241
(Tenn. App. E.S. 1953). See TENx. CoE AwN. § 10343 (Williams 1934).
118. In re Adoption of Myers, 265 S.W.2d 12 (Tenn. 1954).
119. Olson v. Sharpe, 259 S.W.2d 867 (Tenn, App. E.S. 1953).
120. England v. State, 264 S.W.2d 815 (Tenn. 1954).
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Judgment, Res Adjudicata: Where the judge announces his decision
to direct a verdict for one of two defendants and plaintiff proceeds
with evidence against a remaining defendant and thereafter takes a
voluntary nonsuit, a judgment entered in favor of the first defendant
is res adjudicata and bars a later action against him.12, If an issue of
fact is actually litigated and is finally determined between the parties
in one action, the finding is conclusive between the same parties upon
the same issue in another action. Thus where, in a contest of a third
will between the proponent thereof and a contestant, the issue whether
a revocation of that will was procured by the fraud of a designated
person was definitely decided, the proponent of the earlier will can-
not raise against the contestant therein the same issue in a later pro-
ceeding to probate the second will propounded on the theory of de-
pendent relative revocation.122 While it is true that a judgment ex-
onerating a party primarily liable for an alleged wrong will bar an
action by the same plaintiff against a party secondarily liable therefor,
the judgment in favor of a defendant on the ground that the plaintiff's
own conduct was responsible for his harm will not estop him in other
situations from maintaining an action against another party for the
same harm suffered in the same occurrence. Thus a judgment for
defendant in an action against a servant for an injury alleged to have
been caused by the servant's negligence will bar the plaintiff therein
from maintaining an action for the same injury against the servant's
master, but a judgment for one of two defendants whose negligent
conduct is claimed to have caused plaintiff's injury will not bar an
action against the other even though the first judgment was based
upon a finding that plaintiff's own negligence contributed to cause his
injury.12 3 The orthodox rule requires both for res adjudicata and so-
called estoppel by judgment that the parties be the same or be privies
of the parties to the prior action. The exception which makes the
benefit of the first judgment or finding accrue to the party secondarily
liable is based upon the proposition that if the party secondarily liable
is required to pay, he is entitled to be indemnified by the party
primarily liable. "If a judgment against the claimant were not res
judicata in a subsequent action against the indemnitee, either the
indemnitee would be required to pay without the possibility of in-
demnity against the indemnitor, or the indemnitor would be required
to make indemnity for a claim which, in an action by the claimant
against him, had been found not to exist. Obviously it would be un-
fair to the indemnitee to bind him by a judgment for the claimant in
the first proceeding, since he was not a party.'1 24 The same principle,
121. Patterson v. Ridenour, 263 S.W.2d 537 (Tenn. 1953).
122. Wrinkle v. Williams, 260 S.W.2d 304 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1953).
123. Hammons v. Walker Hauling Co., 263 S.W.2d 753 (Tenn. 1953).
124. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 96, comment a (1942).
1954]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
if applied to joint tortfeasors in a situation in which there is a right
to contribution by one against the other, would make the judgment
against one limit the amount recoverable in a later action by the
plaintiff against another. This raises interesting questions which have
not yet been answered in Tennessee.
125
MOTIONS FOR NEW TRIAL
Grounds-Misconduct Affecting Jury: It is misconduct affecting
the jury when a party to the action enters the jury room while the
jurors are present even before they have been finally given the case.
But where the party's conduct was due to ignorance and inadvertence
with no design to influence the jury, and nothing tends to show any
prejudice, the trial judge's denial of a motion for a new trial will not
be reversed.126 The same is true where the alleged misconduct was
that of two officers of the court who were in the jury room for a very
few minutes after the jury retired but before they began their delibera-
tions. 27 The mention by a bystander of the likelihood of liability
insurance in the presence of a few jurors, one of whom casually heard
it without fully appreciating its possible significance, will not require
a new trial unless it is shown that the juror was probably influenced
by it. 128
In Tennessee it seems still to be the law that dispersal of the jury
in a capital case even before they have been given the final charge is
reversible error, but where a group of jurors have dispersed and the
trial is begun anew and these jurors treated as if recalled and defend-
ant has opportunity for challenging them, this rule has no applica-
tion.1
29
Misconduct of Counsel: Objection to improper remarks of counsel in
his final argument to the jury must be taken promptly. A motion for
a mistrial on that ground made after the jury has retired for its
deliberations comes too late. 30 Where the objection was promptly
made accompanied by a motion for a mistrial, and the court sustained
the objection, counsel withdrew the remark and the court charged
the jury in his general charge to disregard it, the failure to rule on the
motion or its denial was not error.'31
Newly Discovered Evidence: Tennessee enforces the universally ac-
125. See RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION §§ 86-102 (1937); American Motorists
Ins. Co. v. Vigen, 213 Minn. 120, 5 N.W.2d 397 (1942).
126. Shew v. Bailey, 260 S.W.2d 362 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1951).
127. England v. State, 264 S.W.2d 815 (Tenn. 1954).
128. Monday v. Millsaps, 264 S.W.2d 6 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1953).
129. England v. State, 264 S.W.2d 815 (Tenn. 1954).
130. Monday v. Millsaps, 264 S.W.2d 6 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1953).
131. Garner v. State ex rel. Askins, 266 S.W.2d 358 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1953).
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cepted rule that a motion for a new trial on the ground of newly dis-
covered evidence must be supported by a showing Vfhat it was dis-
covered after the trial and could not have been discovered in time for
use at the trial by the exercise of due diligence, and that the evidence
must not be merely contradictory or impeaching or cumulative. And
rarely, if ever, will a new trial be granted for newly discovered ex-
pert evidence. -32 Evidence discovered after agreement for a directed
verdict has been closed but before the verdict has been directed can-
not serve as a ground for such a motion.133 A regulation promulgated
under the Defense Production Act of 1950 which was promulgated
almost a year before defendant's answer was filed cannot be considered
newly discovered evidence.133a It was not evidence and the slightest
diligence would have discovered it.
APPEAL AND ERROR
What is Reviewable: A decree of divorce is subject to appeal by the
divorce proctor of the county in which it is rendered under the ap-
plicable Statute, which is designed to protect not the rights of the
parties but the interests of the public. 34 But a ruling which overrules
a demurrer to a plea in abatement is not a final judgment and is not
appealable, 35 and a court of law has no power to grant a discretionary
appeal from a ruling not determinative of the whole case. 3 6 A decision
of a juvenile court which is a court of inferior jurisdiction is review-
able by the circuit court, in the same manner as in an appeal from
the court of a justice of the peace.
3 7
By What Court: Where the chancellor disposed of a case by con-
sidering facts alleged in an exhibit attached to a demurrer and pur-
ported to sustain the demurrer, the decree was based on evidence and
not on demurrer. Hence review on appeal was properly by the Court
of Appeals and not by the Supreme Court. 3s
Formal Requisites, as to Time: The provision limiting the time for
filing a bill of exceptions is mandatory. The trial judge has no author-
ity to approve depositions and exhibits as additions thereto, after the
prescribed period has elapsed. 3 9
132. Monday v. Millsaps, 264 S.W.2d 6 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1953).
133. O'Brien v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 259 S.W.2d 554 (Tenn. App.
M.S. 1952).
133a. Buice v. Scruggs Equipment Co., 267 S.W.2d 119 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1953).
134. Schneider v. Schneider, 260 S.W.2d 290 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1952).
135. Harbison v. Welch, 195 Tenn. 191, 258 S.W.2d 755 (1953).
136. Ibid.
137. Doster v. State, 195 Tenn. 535, 260 S.W.2d 279 (1953).
138. Doty v. Doty, 260 S.W.2d 411 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1952).
139. Anderson v. Sharp, 195 Tenn. 274, 259 S.W.2d 521 (1953).
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*In like manner the time for petition to the Supreme Court for
certiorari to the Court of Appeals is fixed by statute, and neither the
court nor a member thereof has power to allow a petition after the
expiration of the period fixed. A petition for an extension of time
fixed in an earlier order must be made within the period prescribed
in the order; otherwise the court has no jurisdiction to grant it.140
Formal Requisites, as to Bond: Where a defective bond on appeal is
filed within the prescribed time, if the defects are not such as to make
it void, the appeal is not nugatory, and if judgment goes against the
appellant, the sureties on the bond are liable thereon.141
Scope of Review: In the broad appeal under Code Section 9036142
from the decree of the chancellor in an action for demurrage charges,
the Court of Appeals reviews the law and the facts and renders such
decree as the chancellor should have rendered.143 But on review of
a decree removing a clerk of court from his office by summary pro-
ceedings under Code Sections 10076-10081,144 there is no appeal as in
chancery, and no appeal in the nature of a writ of error. An abortive
attempt to appeal as in chancery will, however, be treated as a writ
of error without supersedeas. 14 Here as in so many other instances
the court cuts through mere technical procedural distinctions which
are not due to mandatory provisions.
In an appeal from the chancellor's decree in a disbarment proceed-
ing the Court of Appeals reviews the evidence to determine whether
the chancellor has abused 'his discretion in fixing the punishment.14
Matters occurring after rendition of the judgment are beyond the
scope of review. 4 7 Where such a matter renders the issue on appeal
moot, the appeal will ordinarily be dismissed as in other situations, 48
but where the interests of the public are involved, the court may pro-
ceed to a decision of the question submitted. Thus the Court of Ap-
peals will determine the constitutionality of the statute giving the
divorce proctor the right to appeal and will determine whether the
trial court has discretion to award an absolute divorce to a pregnant
wife, even where the parties have remarried after the decree.14'
Assignment of Error: An assignment of error is too general to re-
quire consideration of specifications urged when it complains merely
140. First State Bank v. Stacey, 195 Tenn. 386, 259 S.W.2d 863 (1953).
141. Arkansas Fuel Oil Co. v. Tanner, 195 Tenn. 553, 260 S.W.2d 286 (1953).
142. TENN. CODE ANN. § 9036 (Williams 1934).
143. Tennessee Cent. Ry. v. Cumberland Storage & Warehouse Co., 260
S.W.2d 208 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1953).
144. TEi. CODE AxN. §§ 10076-10081 (Williams 1934).
145. Trent v. State ex rel. Smith, 195 Tenn. 350, 259 S.W.2d 657 (1953).
146. State ex rel. Turner v. Denman, 259 S.W.2d 891 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1952).
147. Greenville Cabinet Co. v. Ramsey, 195 Tenn. 409 260 S.W.2d 157 (1953).
148. State ex rel. Agee v. Hassler 264 S.W.2d 799 (Tenn. 1954).
149. Schneider v. Schneider, 260 S.W.2d 290 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1952).
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that the judgment is contrary to law and fact,150 or that the decree
was erroneous in not granting an injunction for the reasons set forth
in the bill, the answer and the evidence. 1' Wljere the ground as-
signed for a new trial was that the verdict was against the weight of
the evidence, but not the denial of a motion for a directed verdict
made at the close of all the evidence, an assignment of error upon that
ground is sufficient to require a consideration of the question whether:
a new trial should be granted but not sufficient to justify the court in
determining whether judgment should be rendered in accord with
the motion for directed verdict. 52 Matters objected to at the trial
but not set out as grounds for a motion for a new trial may not be
assigned as errors on appeal. 53 And an error properly assigned but
not supported by the brief is deemed waived. 54
Record on Appeal: The reports continue to show that counsel
must be constantly reminded that unless the record contains a bill of
exceptions on appeal in the nature of a writ of error or on writ of error,
the appellate court can look only to the technical record and cannot
consider the evidence or rulings thereon.155 And if the bill of excep-
tions was not filed within the required time, it cannot be considered
as a part of the record. 56 This means that as to matters occurring
during the course of the trial and ruled upon by the trial judge, the
ruling must have been excepted to and presented as a ground of a
motion for a new trial. 57 It is because the nature of the proceeding is
such that there is no record of the occurrences at the trial and no
provision making possible a bill of exception that the action of a
juvenile court is reviewable by a trial de novo in the circuit court.1' s
Where the testimony in a chancery case is taken orally, a bill of ex-
ceptions is required as in a law case.j'
The responsibility for inclusion in the bill of exceptions of all
matter proper for inclusion upon which the appellant desires to rely
is upon the appellant. Consequently a defendant cannot complain that
he was deprived of his right to have his appeal in a criminal case
fairly considered because the court reporter failed to include therein
150. Plastic Products Co. v. Cook Truck Lines, Inc., 195 Tenn. 463, 260
S.W.2d 178 (1953).
151. Gillespie v. Federal Compress & Warehouse Co., 265 S.W.2d 21 (Tenn.
App. W.S. 1953).
152. City of Memphis v. Uselton, 260 S.W.2d 293 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1953).
153. O'Brien v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 259 S.W.2d 554 (Tenn. App.
M.S. 1952); Monday v. Millsaps, 264 S.W.2d 6 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1953); Green-
ville Cabinet Co. v. Ramsey, 195 Tenn. 409, 260 S.W.2d 157 (1953).
154. McKinnon v. Michaud, 260 S.W.2d 721 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1953).
155. Brown v. VanPelt, 263 S.W.2d 956 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1953); cases cited
in notes 117 and 130 supra.
156. See note 139 supra.
157. Greenville Cabinet Co. v. Ramsey, 195 Tenn. 409, 260 S.W.2d 157 (1953).
158. Doster v. State, 195 Tenn. 535, 260 S.W.2d 279 (1953).
159. Lawson v. Cooper, 263 S.W.2d 763 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1953).
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material requisite to bring a crucial point before the Supreme Court. 00
A motion or suggestion of diminution of the record comes too late
when first presented in a petition to rehear.101
Where several cases were tried together and there was a separate
transcript, a separate motion for a new trial and a separate assignment
of error in each, the court properly ordered that only one bill of ex-
ceptions and one record be sent up. In such a situation each appellant
may assign errors as if he had a separate record and a separate bill of
exceptions.
62
Where the decree of the chancellor afforded the appellant full op-
portunity to secure the same remedy as that sought and denied, the
error, if any, was harmless.' 63
If a defendant in a criminal case whose sentence is suspended in
whole or in part perfects an appeal, the suspension is thereby can-
celled; and if the conviction is affirmed, the judgment will be ordered
modified so as to limit the suspending provision.'0 4
160. Alley v. Schoolfield, 195 Tenn. 541, 260 S.W.2d 281 (1953) (bill to
enjoin execution of judgment).
161. Vaughn v. Gill, 264 S.W.2d 805 (Tenn. 1954).
162. Davidson v. Berger, 259 S.W.2d 541 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1953).
163. Waterhouse v. Perry, 195 Tenn. 458, 260 S.W.2d 176 (1953).
164. Helton v. State, 195 Tenn. 36, 260 S.W.2d 260 (1953); Edgemon v. State,
195 Tenn. 496, 260 S.W.2d 262 (1953).
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